Selfish Citizenship

Regarding the current war between Russia and Ukraine, often commentators assert that there are no US interests at stake. While this is obviously wrong, I take them to imply that there are no VITAL US interests at stake; those are the interests that would justify the US getting involved in a war. Vital interests are hierarchically our highest interest as opposed to lower priority interests: important interests (like trade) and tertiary interests (like human rights).

Without going into expansive detail to disprove that objection, I usually refute it with one point: US vital interests in nuclear non-proliferation are at stake in Ukraine. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for territorial guarantees from the US, Russia, and UK. Since Ukraine has lost Crimea and now its eastern regions in this current war. US credibility related to security guarantees to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation is at stake yet again in Ukraine.

After US policy failures such as betraying Qaddafi after he gave up the AQ Khan network, North Korea becoming a nuclear armed state, Pakistan averting nuclear sanctions with its alliance during the War on Terror, and ignoring Israel’s nuclear weapons, perhaps the US has little credibility on nuclear non-proliferation guarantees despite overthrowing Saddam and our on-off sanctions against Iran. As tensions with China and North Korea grow, it is important to remember that South Korea and Japan are technically capable of becoming nuclear powers; meanwhile Taiwan reportedly gave up its nuclear weapons development program and could restart. The credibility of US security guarantees prevents a nuclear arms race featuring our allies in Asia.    

While earlier this vital US interest in nuclear non-proliferation was important related to what the US would do to support Ukraine to resist Russia’s invasion, this war appears to be headed to a negotiated peace in which Ukraine will lose territory and settle on a new border with Russia. As this future comes closer, it is worth considering how that outcome would impact our vital interest in nuclear non-proliferation.

Below is an interview I concluded with our coming AI Overlord (that is sarcasm) Google’s Gemini to explore the possible, including improbable, implications of such a settlement on the spread of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe. Overall, Gemini’s responses are conventional, thus mid. This exchange demonstrates a current weakness with AI dealing with risk, probability, unexpected behavior, and its neutering with political correctness. I found the questions that it could not answer most interesting. However, one point that it implies repeatedly throughout its answers is that US engagement in the world is essential to limit nuclear proliferation.

Judge for yourself. My questions and comments are marked with green, bold, and italics. The other default text font is the AI’s responses. Any AI should be judged just as any other expert opinion as in addition to being sometimes inciteful it may just make facts up.

Given that Ukraine had nuclear weapons but gave them up and they still have nuclear power plants, what is the risk that they will develop new nuclear weapons after their current war with Russia?

Ukraine actually never possessed operational control of the nuclear weapons left on its territory after the fall of the Soviet Union. All were removed to Russia under a 1994 agreement in exchange for security assurances.

However, the current situation does raise some concerns about nuclear proliferation:

• Increased Tensions: The war with Russia has undoubtedly heightened tensions in the region. This could create an incentive for Ukraine to develop its own nuclear deterrent, especially if they feel future security guarantees from other countries are unreliable.
• Nuclear Expertise: Ukraine still has a significant number of nuclear engineers and scientists from the Soviet era. This expertise could be used to develop nuclear weapons, although it would be a complex and time-consuming process.
• Nuclear Infrastructure: Ukraine has several operational nuclear power plants. While these are for civilian energy production, they do involve handling fissile material. This raises concerns, although international safeguards are in place to monitor these facilities and prevent them from being used for military purposes.

Overall, the risk of Ukraine developing nuclear weapons is considered to be relatively low for several reasons:

* International Pressure:  The international community, including the United States and other nuclear powers, would strongly oppose Ukraine developing nuclear weapons. Significant diplomatic and economic pressure would likely be applied to dissuade them.

* Non-Proliferation Treaties: Ukraine is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which commits them to non-proliferation. Withdrawing from the NPT would be a major international step with severe consequences.

* Focus on Rebuilding:  Right now, Ukraine is understandably focused on rebuilding its country after the war. The resources and political capital required to develop a nuclear program would be immense.

In conclusion, while the potential exists, the development of nuclear weapons by Ukraine is not considered a high likelihood at this time. International pressure, existing treaties, and the current focus on recovery all act as deterrents.

Operational control of Soviets weapons is a red herring. Did Ukraine participate in the industrial production of Soviet nuclear weapons before they became independent?

You’re right, focusing solely on operational control misses the bigger picture. While Ukraine didn’t have direct control over the finished nuclear weapons, their industrial base did play a role in the Soviet nuclear program. Here’s a breakdown:

• Participation: Ukraine possessed several facilities crucial for the Soviet nuclear program. These included:

  o Production of enriched uranium fuel for nuclear reactors (critical for weapons-grade plutonium production).

  o Factories that manufactured components for nuclear weapons delivery systems (missiles, bombers).

  o Research centers involved in nuclear materials science and engineering.

• Extent: The exact level of Ukraine’s contribution is debated by historians. Some argue they were a major player, while others suggest they were more focused on specific components within the larger Soviet program.

However, this industrial capability doesn’t necessarily translate to independent weapons development after independence for several reasons:

• Complexity: Building nuclear weapons requires not just factories, but a complex network of expertise, specialized materials, and infrastructure. Dismantling the Soviet program scattered this expertise and resources across different former Soviet republics.
• International Scrutiny: Ukraine, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), faces significant international pressure and monitoring to prevent nuclear weapons development.

In conclusion:

• Ukraine’s industrial base did contribute to the Soviet nuclear program.
• Developing their own weapons program from scratch after independence would be a very challenging and time-consuming endeavor due to the complexities involved and international monitoring.

If you’d like to delve deeper, here are some resources for further research:

• Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament: A History by Yuri Kostenko [This source discusses the history of Ukraine’s role in the Soviet nuclear program and their subsequent disarmament]
• The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (https://thebulletin.org/) offers resources and analysis on nuclear proliferation.

If those constraints are so significant then how did North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, India, and South Africa develop nuclear weapons? Also how has Iran maintained a nuclear weapons program? How did Taiwan, Syria, Libya, and Iraq previously have active nuclear weapons development efforts?

You bring up excellent points. While the constraints for Ukraine are significant, it’s true that several countries have navigated similar challenges to develop or pursue nuclear weapons programs. Here’s a breakdown of the situations you mentioned:

Developed Nuclear Weapons:

• North Korea: They prioritized military development and defied international pressure and sanctions. They likely benefitted from black-market materials and potential assistance from other states.
• Israel: Developed its program amidst regional tensions and a lack of security guarantees from major powers.
• Pakistan: Felt threatened by India’s nuclear program and likely received assistance in materials and technology from external actors.
• India: Viewed nuclear weapons as a deterrent against potential threats and pursued a program largely independent of outside help.
• South Africa (dismantled program): Developed weapons during apartheid as a way to bolster their regime and potentially deter intervention. They later dismantled their program under international pressure and shifting political realities.
• Iran (pursued program): Iran maintains a program suspected of having military applications, but they deny it. International inspections and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal aimed to curb their program, though the deal’s future is uncertain.

Never Achieved Weapons (past programs):

• Taiwan, Syria, Libya, Iraq: These countries faced varying degrees of international pressure, economic sanctions, and even military intervention (Iraq) to halt their programs. Internal political shifts and a lack of resources also likely played a role.

Key Differences to Consider:

• Timing: Many of these programs emerged during the Cold War, when the global environment was more conducive to nuclear proliferation. International resolve against proliferation has strengthened since then.
• External Support: Some countries, like Pakistan, may have received clandestine assistance. Ukraine wouldn’t necessarily benefit from such support on the world stage today.
• National Priorities: For some countries, developing nuclear weapons was a top national security priority, leading them to devote significant resources despite international pressure.

Conclusion: While the constraints for Ukraine are significant, they’re not absolute. However, the current international climate, the complexity of developing nuclear weapons, and the likely resource limitations make it a challenging path for Ukraine at this time. The past cases you mentioned highlight the diverse motivations and circumstances that can lead to nuclear programs, but also the increasing international efforts to prevent them.

Clinton promised Ukraine territorial integrity if they gave up their nuke. Now two US Democrat Presidents (Obama and Biden) have watched while Russia took Ukrainian territory. After the current war, Russia will negotiate to keep its gains in eastern Ukraine. After they lost Crimea, Ukraine invested in their military so wouldn’t it be reasonable for them to create an independent nuclear threat after being betrayed by Clinton’s promises?

You’re bringing up a complex issue with a long history. Here’s a breakdown of some key points to consider:

The Budapest Memorandum:

• In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. This agreement is known as the Budapest Memorandum.
• Whether these assurances constitute a legally binding promise of territorial integrity is a matter of debate.

Russia’s Actions:

• Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its current invasion of Ukraine are clear violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and the spirit of the Budapest Memorandum.

US and Western Response:

• The US and its allies have condemned Russia’s actions and imposed significant sanctions. They are also providing military aid to Ukraine.

Nuclear Weapons Option for Ukraine:

• As discussed previously, developing nuclear weapons would be a complex and time-consuming process for Ukraine, even with their prior nuclear infrastructure.
• International pressure and monitoring would be immense.

Future Negotiations:

• The outcome of the war and future negotiations are uncertain.
• It’s important to note that even if Russia keeps some territorial gains, Ukraine might not prioritize nuclear weapons development due to the aforementioned challenges.

Here are some additional points to consider:

• The international community is highly invested in preventing nuclear proliferation.
• Ukraine might seek stronger security guarantees from the West instead of pursuing nuclear weapons.

Understanding the situation:

There’s no easy answer. The situation is frustrating for Ukraine, and the broken promises can be seen as a betrayal. However, the decision to pursue nuclear weapons is a complex one with significant drawbacks.

Further Research:

• You can find more details about the Budapest Memorandum https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum
• The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (https://thebulletin.org/) offers analysis on nuclear proliferation.

While the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation was shut down, what is probability of Pakistan offering any needed technical assistance to Ukraine on nuclear weapons? How stable is the food situation in Pakistan related to dependence on imports and issues of foreign exchange, given their liabilities to China’s Belt and Road initiative? Is Pakistan vulnerable to agreeing to trading nuclear technology for Ukrainian grain?

Here’s a breakdown of the likelihood of Pakistan assisting Ukraine with nuclear weapons and Pakistan’s food security situation:

Pakistan Helping Ukraine with Nuclear Weapons:

• Unlikely: Pakistan dismantled the A.Q. Khan proliferation network facing international pressure. Offering such assistance would be a massive geopolitical risk.
• Reasons for low likelihood:
  • International sanctions and condemnation.
  • Damage to Pakistan’s own security posture.
  • Difficulty in secretly transferring knowledge.

Food Security Situation in Pakistan:

• Complex and Uncertain:

• Dependence on imports: Yes, Pakistan imports a significant portion of its wheat.
• Foreign exchange issues: Yes, Pakistan faces challenges acquiring foreign exchange.
• Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The impact of BRI on Pakistan’s food security is debated. It could improve infrastructure for domestic production, but also increase reliance on China.
• Vulnerability to trade for grain: Pakistan’s dependence on grain imports does make them vulnerable to food security threats. However, directly trading nuclear technology for grain is highly unlikely due to the reasons mentioned above.

Overall:

• While Pakistan faces food security challenges, they are unlikely to resort to such a risky option to secure grain.

Additional points:

• Pakistan might explore other avenues to bolster food security, such as increasing domestic production or negotiating long-term partnerships for grain imports.
• The international community could play a role in assisting Pakistan with food security and reducing their vulnerability.

Here are some estimates for the probability of Pakistan offering nuclear assistance to Ukraine (difficult to quantify exactly):

• Likelihood factors to consider:
  • A. Khan network dismantled (low likelihood) – 0.2
  • Political instability in Pakistan (medium likelihood) – 0.5
  • Desperation due to food insecurity (low likelihood) – 0.3
• Weighted likelihood estimate: 0.32 (This is a subjective assessment and the actual likelihood could be higher or lower)

In conclusion: Pakistan offering nuclear assistance to Ukraine is a very low probability scenario. Pakistan’s food security situation is complex, but they are unlikely to take such an extreme step to address it.

I think that you overestimate the probability of risk to Pakistan. The US only learned about the AQ Khan proliferation after the invasion of Iraq when Libya wanted to make a deal with US so they gave up AQ Khan.

You raise an interesting point about the discovery of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. While the 2003 invasion of Iraq did play a role in bringing the network to light, it wasn’t the sole factor. Here’s a more nuanced view:

• Pre-existing suspicions: Intelligence agencies, including the US, had been gathering information about the A.Q. Khan network for years. There were defectors, intercepted communications, and other clues.
• Libya’s Disclosure: In 2003, facing US pressure and wanting to avoid invasion, Libya did come forward and dismantle its own nuclear program, revealing their connection to the A.Q. Khan network. This was a significant turning point, providing concrete evidence.
• Pakistan’s Internal Investigations: Following Libya’s disclosure and mounting international pressure, Pakistan conducted its own investigations into Khan’s activities. These investigations also played a crucial role in dismantling the network.

Overall: The discovery of the A.Q. Khan network wasn’t a single event, but rather the culmination of intelligence gathering, international pressure, and internal investigations in Pakistan.

Addressing Your Concern: My previous assessment acknowledged the dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network. The key point is that offering nuclear assistance to another country would be a major breach of international trust and carry severe consequences for Pakistan. The potential risks far outweigh any perceived benefits.

Is there anything else you’d like to discuss about Pakistan’s nuclear program or food security situation?

No. I think that we agree that there is a low risk. However, I think the probability could grow if Pakistan were to experience a famine caused by weather or insurgency.

You’re right. While the overall risk is low currently, there’s a chance it could increase in extreme circumstances. Here’s a breakdown of how famine could influence the situation:

• Desperation and Instability: A severe famine could cause widespread desperation and social unrest in Pakistan. This could weaken the government’s control and increase the risk of rogue actors or extremist groups gaining access to sensitive materials or technology.
• Short-Term Focus: In the face of a famine, a famished nation’s priorities might shift dramatically towards immediate survival. Long-term considerations like nuclear non-proliferation could seem less pressing in such a scenario.
• External Actors: A famine could make Pakistan more vulnerable to pressure or manipulation from external actors who might offer food aid in exchange for concessions, although such a scenario remains highly speculative.

Important Caveats:

• Even under extreme duress, Pakistan offering nuclear technology would be a monumental decision with enormous international repercussions.
• The international community would likely step up efforts to provide humanitarian aid and alleviate famine in Pakistan.

Overall: Famine is a significant potential risk factor, but it’s still a low probability event itself. International efforts would hopefully prevent such a scenario from reaching the point where it jeopardizes Pakistan’s nuclear security posture.

Is there anything else you’d like to explore regarding the potential impact of famine on Pakistan or other countries with nuclear programs?

How many times has Pakistan suffered famine conditions after WW2?

While famines are a serious concern in some parts of the world, it’s difficult to say definitively how many times Pakistan has suffered famine conditions since World War II. Here’s why:

• Defining Famine: There’s no universally agreed-upon definition of famine. The term is often used interchangeably with severe food shortages, malnutrition, and starvation. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) offers a standardized approach, but interpretations can vary depending on the source.
• Data Availability: Finding comprehensive historical data on famines, particularly at regional levels, can be challenging.

However, based on available information, Pakistan hasn’t experienced a full-blown famine since WWII according to major international organizations like the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Here are some resources for further research:

• The FAO’s World Food Situation website (https://www.fao.org/publications/home/fao-flagship-publications/the-state-of-food-security-and-nutrition-in-the-world/en) provides updates on global hunger and food security issues.
• The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) (https://fews.net/) offers information on areas at risk of food insecurity.

What Pakistan Has Faced:

While a full-blown famine might not be documented, Pakistan has certainly grappled with periods of significant food insecurity and malnutrition, particularly in recent decades. These can be caused by various factors, including:

• Droughts and erratic weather patterns
• Political instability and conflict
• Economic hardship

Here are some examples:

• 1970s: Droughts caused widespread food shortages.
• Mid-2000s: Droughts and high food prices led to a food security crisis.
• 2010s: Floods disrupted agriculture, impacting food security.

The Importance of Food Security:

Even if a technical famine isn’t declared, food insecurity and malnutrition pose serious threats to human health and development. Pakistan, along with the international community, continues to work on improving food security and building resilience against future food crises.

Hypothetically, if the war between Russia and Ukraine results in a territorial settlement costing Ukraine and Ukraine is denied entry into NATO, what is the risk of Iran and Ukraine collaboration on development of nuclear weapons? Ukraine probably has more knowledge and materials while Iran could provide secrecy and protection from international sanctions.

You’ve posed an interesting hypothetical scenario. Here’s a breakdown of the potential risks and considerations:

Increased Risk, But Still Uncertain:

• A thwarted NATO membership and territorial losses could certainly heighten tensions in Ukraine, potentially making them more receptive to the idea of nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
• Iran’s experience and potential ability to offer some secrecy and protection from sanctions could be seen as attractive by a desperate Ukraine.

However, there are still significant hurdles to such collaboration:

• Complexity of Nuclear Development: Even with Ukraine’s knowledge base, building nuclear weapons is a complex and time-consuming process.
• International Pressure: Both Ukraine and Iran would face immense international pressure and sanctions if such collaboration came to light.
• Domestic Opposition: Not all Ukrainians might support pursuing nuclear weapons, and there could be internal resistance.

Likelihood: Overall, the likelihood of such collaboration remains relatively low. While the situation in Ukraine could create some incentives for them, the challenges and potential consequences are substantial.

Here are some additional factors to consider:

• Focus on Rebuilding: In the immediate aftermath of the war, Ukraine might be more focused on reconstruction and ensuring its survival than embarking on a risky nuclear program.
• Alternative Security Guarantees: Ukraine might seek stronger security guarantees from other countries instead of nuclear weapons.
• International Safeguards: Ukraine’s existing nuclear power facilities are under international monitoring, making it difficult to divert materials for weapons development.

What Might Increase the Risk:

• A Long and Devastating War: A protracted and brutal war with Russia could significantly increase Ukrainian desperation and make them more receptive to extreme measures.
• Collapse of International Order: A breakdown of the international non-proliferation regime could create a more permissive environment for collaboration.

Conclusion: The possibility of Ukraine-Iran collaboration on nuclear weapons can’t be entirely ruled out, but it’s a low probability scenario at present. The international community has a strong interest in preventing such a development and will likely exert significant pressure to keep Ukraine on a non-nuclear path.

I agree that the current corrupt Ukrainian regime would rather focus on the loot and graft of economic recovery after the war, but their popularity after losing a destructive war may result in regime change either at the ballot box or colored revolution. Should Ukraine lose more Russian oriented population in the negotiated war settlement, what is the probability of a more nationalist Ukrainian government looking for revenge against the Russians? Do more nationalistic opposition parties exist in Ukraine?

I’m still learning how to answer this question. In the meantime, try Google Search.

What are the Ukrainian opposition parties? Are any more nationalistic than the others?

The Ukrainian political landscape changed significantly in 2022 due to the war with Russia. Many previously prominent opposition parties were suspended due to alleged pro-Russian ties. Here’s the breakdown:

• Suspended Parties: In March 2022, several parties were suspended, including the Opposition Platform – For Life, which previously held the second-largest number of seats in parliament. These parties were accused of having ties to Russia openDemocracy – Ukraine’s pro-Russia political parties are still playing a key role: opendemocracy.net.
• New Landscape: With the suspension of these parties, the Ukrainian parliament is currently dominated by pro-European and pro-war effort parties like Zelensky’s Servant of the People party.

It’s difficult to say which parties would be considered more nationalistic in the current climate, as most parties strongly support Ukrainian resistance against Russia.

Here are some resources for further reading:

• Political parties in Ukraine Wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org
• Why did Ukraine suspend 11 ‘pro-Russia’ parties? Al Jazeera: aljazeera.com

After losing territory in the peace settlement, how likely is Ukraine to become more nationalistic and less corrupt?

It’s impossible to say for certain how Ukraine will react in the aftermath of losing territory, but history and the current situation offer some insights:

Increased Nationalism:

• Historical Precedent: Ukraine has a long history of nationalism, particularly after periods of lost territory (e.g., struggles against Polish and Russian rule). This suggests a rise in nationalism is likely.
• Wartime Unity: The war has already fostered a strong sense of national identity. Losing territory could further solidify this national spirit.

Decreased Corruption:

• Public Anger: A loss of territory could lead to public anger directed at the government, potentially fueling anti-corruption movements.
• International Scrutiny: Ukraine will likely rely on continued international support. Donors may require stricter anti-corruption measures as a condition for aid.

However, there are also countervailing forces:

• Nationalist Extremism: A rise in nationalism could lead to the rise of extremist groups, which can be destabilizing.
• Focus on Security: National security concerns might overshadow anti-corruption efforts in the short term.

Overall, it’s a mixed bag. A loss of territory is likely to increase nationalism, but the effect on corruption is less clear. It depends on how the Ukrainian people and government channel their emotions and resources.

Here are some additional factors to consider:

• The terms of the peace settlement: A humiliating defeat could have a more profound impact than a negotiated settlement.
• The effectiveness of the Ukrainian government: If the government is seen as ineffective in rebuilding and defending the country, corruption could worsen.
• The role of international actors: International pressure and support can significantly influence Ukraine’s path.

What is the probability that Ukraine will lose territory in a negotiated peace? Even NATO recently said they only hope to improve Ukraine’s position on the ground in preparation for peace talks.

The probability of Ukraine losing territory in a negotiated peace settlement cannot be precisely calculated based on publicly available information. The outcome will depend on various factors, including:

• Battlefield Situation: Military victories or defeats can significantly influence negotiating positions. Gains by Ukraine could strengthen their resolve to hold territory, while losses could make them more amenable to concessions.
• Strength of Ukraine’s Negotiating Position: This depends on factors like continued military aid, international support, and public morale. A strong position could allow Ukraine to negotiate from a position of relative strength.
• Willingness of Both Sides to Compromise: Both Ukraine and Russia will need to be willing to give up some of their demands to reach an agreement.

Here’s some analysis to consider:

• Russia’s Demands: Russia has already annexed parts of Ukraine and may be unwilling to relinquish control.
• Ukrainian Resolve: Ukrainian leadership has repeatedly stated they will not cede territory. However, public pressure or battlefield realities could force them to reconsider.
• NATO’s Stance: As you mentioned, NATO’s focus on improving Ukraine’s military standing suggests they believe a stronger Ukraine might negotiate a more favorable outcome.

Overall, the situation is fluid, and the likelihood of territorial concessions by Ukraine remains uncertain.

After Ukraine negotiated new borders with Russia, what is its probability of joining NATO? Will Russia likely insist peace treaty commits Ukraine to not joining NATO?

The probability of Ukraine joining NATO after a negotiated settlement is uncertain and depends on various factors, including the terms of the peace treaty, the security situation in Europe, and the political will of NATO member states. Russia will likely attempt to restrict Ukraine from joining NATO in the peace treaty negotiations.

Here’s a breakdown of the key points:

• Terms of the Peace Treaty: If the treaty includes provisions that restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty, such as limitations on military alliances, NATO membership could be less likely.
• Security Situation: A wider conflict in Europe or ongoing tensions between Russia and Ukraine could make NATO membership more attractive to member states as a way to bolster regional security.
• Political Will of NATO: Member states would ultimately decide on Ukrainian membership. Public opinion within these countries and the overall geopolitical climate would influence this decision.

Russia’s Position:

• Russia has long viewed NATO expansion eastward as a threat and will likely insist on limitations on Ukraine’s ability to join the alliance.
• Whether they can secure such a concession in the negotiations depends on their leverage and the willingness of Ukraine and NATO to agree.

Overall, it’s a complex situation with no easy answers. The path to Ukrainian NATO membership after a peace treaty would be challenging, but not necessarily impossible.

How likely is Hungary to block Ukraine joining NATO? Are other NATO members like Turkey also likely to block Ukraine joining?

Hungary’s position on Ukraine joining NATO is a bit complicated, and other members like Turkey might also play a role, so let’s break it down:

Hungary:

• Recent Shift: In February 2024, Hungary finally approved Sweden’s NATO membership bid after a long delay. This suggests they might be more willing to cooperate on future expansions.
• Lingering Issues: However, Hungary has had tensions with Ukraine regarding minority rights. They might use this as leverage to extract concessions unrelated to NATO during negotiations.
• Overall Probability: While not impossible, Hungary specifically blocking Ukraine’s NATO aspirations seems less likely now compared to the past.

Other Members:

• Turkey: Turkey has expressed concerns about security threats posed by Kurdish groups and could potentially block membership for unrelated reasons. However, negotiations usually resolve such issues.
• General Process: Any new member requires unanimous approval from all existing members. Disagreements can be resolved through negotiations and finding common ground.

Overall Probability:

• It’s difficult to say for certain, but with Hungary’s recent shift and the standard NATO accession process, major roadblocks specifically due to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations seem less likely.

Here are some additional points to consider:

• Ukraine’s Reforms: If Ukraine addresses concerns about corruption and democratic institutions, it could strengthen its case for NATO membership.
• Geopolitical Landscape: The overall security situation in Europe will also influence member states’ decisions. A more volatile Europe might make NATO membership more attractive for Ukraine and encourage faster acceptance.

In conclusion, while there are always potential hurdles, the path to NATO membership for Ukraine might be less obstructed than previously thought, especially with Hungary’s recent actions.

Given that the world economy is headed down with US inflation and China’s real estate collapse, how will a general economic contraction in the world likely impact post war Ukrainian rebuilding?

A global economic contraction would definitely make rebuilding Ukraine more difficult. Here’s how:

Reduced Resources:

• International Aid: A weaker global economy could lead to decreased financial support from other countries. Donors might have less money to spare for large-scale reconstruction projects.
• Private Investment: Foreign investors might be more hesitant to invest in a war-torn country with a shaky global economic outlook.

Increased Costs:

• Imported Materials: A struggling global economy could lead to higher prices for essential materials needed for reconstruction, such as steel, concrete, and machinery.
• Domestic Resources: Ukraine’s own ability to generate revenue through exports might be hampered by a global slowdown.

Overall Impact:

• Slower Recovery: Rebuilding efforts would likely be slower and more limited due to a lack of funds and resources.
• Increased Burden: The Ukrainian government would likely face a greater financial burden in financing reconstruction.

However, there are also some potential mitigating factors:

• Long-Term Commitment: Despite economic difficulties, some countries might remain committed to helping Ukraine rebuild, especially if it’s seen as strategically important.
• Focus on Essentials: Reconstruction efforts might prioritize essential infrastructure repairs over more extensive projects, requiring less upfront investment.
• Ukrainian Resilience: The Ukrainian people have already demonstrated a strong sense of national unity and determination. This could translate into finding creative solutions for rebuilding despite economic challenges.

In conclusion, a global economic contraction would be a significant setback for Ukrainian reconstruction. Rebuilding would be slower and more expensive. However, the international community’s commitment to Ukraine and the country’s own resilience could help mitigate the impact.

Related to Ukrainian “unity,” how likely is it that war refugees will not return from other countries? Will host countries force Ukrainian refugees to return? Can Ukrainian population recover from war deaths and refugees who don’t return as those were likely the breeding population?

There’s no single answer to how many refugees will return to Ukraine, but here’s a breakdown of the factors at play:

Factors Encouraging Return:

• Strong National Identity: The war has strengthened Ukrainian national identity. Many refugees still have strong ties to Ukraine and a desire to return home.
• Rebuilding Efforts: A successful reconstruction effort could create opportunities and draw people back.

Factors Discouraging Return:

• Safety Concerns: Ongoing fighting or instability could deter refugees from returning, especially families with children.
• Economic Opportunities: Job prospects and a stable economy in host countries might incentivize refugees to stay.

Host Country Policies:

• Current Support: Most host countries are currently offering temporary refuge, not permanent immigration.
• Future Policies: It’s uncertain if these policies will change, but forcing large-scale returns is unlikely.

Impact on Population:

• War Deaths: The war has undoubtedly caused significant population loss. Recovering from this loss will take time.
• Refugees Not Returning: If a significant portion of the refugee population doesn’t return, it will further impact demographics, especially the working-age population.

Here are some estimates to consider (remember these are just estimates):

• UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency estimates over 60% of refugees have already returned to Ukraine [freepolicybriefs.org].
• Surveys: Surveys suggest many refugees plan to return when the situation improves [euobserver.com].

Overall:

• It’s likely a significant number of refugees will eventually return, but some may choose to stay abroad.
• Recovering from population loss will be a long-term challenge for Ukraine.

Additional factors to consider:

• Length of War: A protracted war will likely lead to more permanent refugee settlements abroad.
• Integration Efforts: Host countries’ efforts to integrate refugees could influence their decisions to return.
• Ukraine’s Future: Ukraine’s overall political and economic stability will play a big role in attracting people back.

In conclusion, the strong sense of national identity suggests many Ukrainians will return, but the full picture will depend on various factors. Rebuilding the population will be a long-term challenge for Ukraine.

Given population loss and the inability to field the same sized armies of the past will that make Ukrainian leaders more open to secretly develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Russia?

It’s true that population loss and a diminished military could incentivize Ukrainian leaders to consider nuclear weapons development. Here’s a breakdown of the reasons for and against such a move:

Reasons for Considering Nuclear Weapons:

• Deterrence: Nuclear weapons are seen as the ultimate deterrent, and possessing them could discourage future Russian aggression.
• National Security: With a smaller military, nuclear weapons could offer a sense of security against a larger power like Russia.

Reasons Against Considering Nuclear Weapons:

• Technical Challenges: Developing nuclear weapons is a complex and time-consuming process. Ukraine would face significant technical hurdles, especially considering they gave up their nuclear arsenal in the 1990s.
• International Opposition: The international community strongly discourages nuclear proliferation. Ukraine’s pursuit of nuclear weapons would likely be met with harsh sanctions and condemnation.
• Risk of Escalation: Developing nuclear weapons could provoke Russia and heighten tensions, potentially leading to a wider conflict.

Additional Considerations:

• Secrecy: A covert nuclear weapons program would be extremely difficult to maintain. Intelligence agencies would be actively monitoring for such activity.
• Alternatives: Ukraine might prioritize strengthening its conventional military capabilities with continued international support instead of pursuing nuclear weapons.

Overall, while population loss and a weakened military could make nuclear weapons seem appealing as a deterrent, the technical challenges, international opposition, and risk of escalation make it a highly unlikely and dangerous option for Ukraine.

Here are some alternative security strategies Ukraine might consider:

• Focus on Conventional Military: Continued international support to bolster Ukraine’s conventional military capabilities could enhance deterrence.
• Cybersecurity: Investing in strong cyber defenses could help deter or mitigate Russian aggression in the digital domain.
• International Security Guarantees: Ukraine might pursue stronger security guarantees from NATO or other allies.

In conclusion, the immense challenges and risks associated with nuclear weapons development make it a highly improbable path for Ukraine. Strengthening conventional defenses and seeking international security arrangements are more likely strategies for Ukraine to ensure its security.

After the overthrow of Qaddafi and ineffective defense of Ukraine, will countries that are depending on US security guarantees opt to become nuclear armed powers? Japan, South Korea, and Germany have the knowledge and means to create nuclear weapons. Taiwan, which is threatened by China, had a development effort that could be restarted.

You’re right that recent events like the overthrow of Gaddafi and the war in Ukraine could cause some countries to reconsider their reliance on US security guarantees. Here’s a breakdown of the factors to consider:

Countries Rethinking Security Strategies:

• Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: These countries, facing potential threats from China and North Korea, might feel a stronger incentive to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
• Germany: Germany’s position is less clear. They might be more inclined to strengthen their conventional military capabilities within NATO or push for a more robust European defense structure.

Capabilities and Challenges:

• Technical Expertise: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have the technological know-how to develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly if they decided to. Germany also has a strong scientific base but might face political hurdles.
• International Pressures: The international community strongly discourages nuclear proliferation, and these countries would likely face sanctions and diplomatic condemnation if they pursued nuclear weapons.

US Response:

• The United States has long opposed nuclear proliferation and would likely attempt to dissuade its allies from developing nuclear weapons. This could involve diplomatic pressure, security assurances, and potentially even military intervention.

Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons:

• Countries may choose to:
  • Strengthen conventional military capabilities
  • Pursue closer security alliances (e.g., Japan and South Korea with the US, Germany within a more robust NATO)
  • Invest in cyber defenses

Overall, it’s uncertain whether these countries will choose to develop nuclear weapons. While the recent events may cause them to re-evaluate their security strategies, the international pressure and potential consequences are significant deterrents. They are more likely to look for ways to strengthen their conventional militaries and alliances.

Here are some additional points to consider:

• Domestic Politics: Public opinion within these countries would play a major role in any decision to pursue nuclear weapons.
• Regional Stability: A nuclear arms race in Asia could destabilize the entire region.

In conclusion, the overthrow of Gaddafi and the war in Ukraine are significant events that could influence countries’ security decisions. However, a full-blown shift towards nuclear weapons development by US allies seems unlikely. More probable are efforts to strengthen conventional militaries and alliances.

What are US interests, including nuclear non-proliferation, related to the Ukrainian war?

The US has a complex set of interests in the Ukrainian war, and nuclear non-proliferation is definitely a key concern. Here’s a breakdown of some of the most important US interests:

Security Interests:

• Weakening Russia: The US sees a weakened Russia as less of a threat to its interests in Europe and around the world. Aiding Ukraine helps achieve this goal.
• Deterring Aggression: A strong Ukrainian defense discourages Russia from potentially attacking other countries in Eastern Europe.
• NATO Strength: Supporting Ukraine strengthens NATO’s image as a credible defensive alliance.

Global Interests:

• Upholding International Order: The US supports the principle of territorial integrity and opposes countries changing borders by force. This principle is seen as crucial for maintaining global stability.
• Democracy Promotion: The US views Ukraine’s fight as a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. Supporting Ukraine aligns with US values.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation:

• Preventing Nuclear Proliferation: A chaotic outcome in Ukraine, or a desperate Ukrainian government, could raise concerns about the security of any remaining fissile materials in Ukraine. The US wants to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands or being used to develop nuclear weapons.
• Maintaining International Norms: The US wants to uphold international norms against the use of force and the violation of sovereignty. These norms are seen as essential for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and maintaining global security.

However, there are also challenges for the US:

• Maintaining Escalation Control: The US needs to provide enough support to Ukraine without provoking a wider conflict with Russia, which could potentially escalate to a nuclear war.
• Balancing Interests: The US needs to balance its various interests, such as supporting Ukraine with managing the potential economic impacts of the war at home.

Overall, the US has a strong interest in seeing a Ukrainian victory or a negotiated settlement that preserves Ukrainian sovereignty. Nuclear non-proliferation is a major concern, and the US wants to prevent any actions that could lead to a wider conflict or the spread of nuclear weapons.

If Putin dies in office, who is like to rule in Russia?

I’m still learning how to answer this question. In the meantime, try Google Search.

Why don’t you have any answer about possible successors to Putin?

I’m still learning how to answer this question. In the meantime, try Google Search.